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Abstract
We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner’s
dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social
partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updat-
ing occurs between a randomly chosen focal node and its randomly selected
neighbour. The focal agent becomes the strategy recipient and may imitate
the strategy of the neighbour according to the payoff difference, i.e. voter-
model-like dynamics (VMLD), or becomes a strategy donor and thus may
be imitated by the neighbour, i.e. invasion-process-like dynamics (IPLD).
For edge-based updating rules, one edge is selected, and the roles of the two
connected nodes (donor or recipient) are randomly decided, i.e. edge-based
dynamics (EBD). A computer simulation shows that partner switching sup-
ports the evolution of cooperation under VMLD, which has been utilised
in many studies on spatial evolutionary games, whereas cooperators often
vanish under IPLD. The EBD results lie between these two processes. This
difference is prominent among nodes with large degrees. In addition, part-
ner switching induces a non-monotonic relationship between the fraction of
cooperators and intensity of selection under VMLD and EBD, and a weak
or strong selection supports cooperation. In contrast, only a strong selection
supports cooperators under IPLD. Similar differences in the enhancement of
cooperation are observed when games are played on static heterogeneous net-
works. Our results imply that the direction of imitation is quite important
for understanding the evolutionary process of cooperation.
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Cooperation
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation is an actively studied subject in physical
and biological science [1–3]. In social interactions, cooperators must pay
a cost for the benefit of others. Despite the benefit of mutual cooperation,
natural selection appears to hinder the evolution of cooperation because non-
cooperative individuals can receive the benefit of cooperation without bearing
the cost of a cooperative act. The prisoner’s dilemma is a widely adopted
framework that represents this social dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma
game, two players (agents) simultaneously choose whether to cooperate (C)
or defect (D). They will receive R if both choose cooperation and P if both
choose defection. If one player cooperates and the other one defects, the
cooperator receives S and the defector receives T . Because the order of the
payoff is T > R > P > S, players should choose D regardless of the partner’s
choice if they wish to maximise their own payoff. This temptation leads to
mutual defection, although the realised payoff (P ) is smaller than the result
of mutual cooperation (R). However, this prediction contradicts the widely
observed cooperation in actual human society.
Many models have been proposed to study the evolutionary origin of co-
operation, including the effect of the network (spatial) structure. In their
pioneering work, Nowak and May [4] showed that cooperation proliferates
if the players are located on a two-dimensional lattice. Subsequent stud-
ies introduced complex networks that incorporate the properties of actual
networks, such as high clustering and degree heterogeneity, and defined the
effects of them on the evolution of cooperation. Notably, a scale-free network
gives a unified explanation on the emergence of cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma as well as other games [5–7]. These studies highlight the importance
of the heterogeneity in degree (i.e. the number of neighbours of each node).
Following works examined the robustness of this phenomenon under wider
conditions [8–11]. In addition, the effect of the network structure on the
evolution of cooperation was investigated in other networks, including ran-
dom regular graphs [12], small world networks [13–15] and actual social net-
works [16–18]. Furthermore, the role of networks in resolving social dilemma
was investigated in combination with other mechanisms, including voluntary
participation [19, 20], heterogeneous teaching activity [21–23], time scale for
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strategy updating [24–26], payoff aspiration [27–29], conformity [30–32] and
punishment [33–36].
In addition to analysing the effect of static networks, recent literature
analysed a coevolutionary game where both the network structure and the
players’ strategy evolve. In coevolutionary games, agents can sever the rela-
tionship with a current neighbour and construct a new link with other agents
[37–53]. In many of these models, the criterion of the continuation of the re-
lationship depends on the agents’ strategy or payoff from the game. These
studies showed that the possibility of partner switching (link adaptation)
greatly enhances the evolution of cooperation compared to static graphs.
The effect of coevolution was also studied with other games, including the
snowdrift game [54, 55], stag hunt game [56] and ultimatum game [57–59].
In many of these studies, it is assumed during strategy evolution one ran-
domly chosen focal agent (node) decides whether to imitate the strategy of a
randomly chosen neighbour by comparing their payoff from games [60]. This
means that the role of a focal agent is fixed to a strategy recipient, whereas
that of a neighbour is fixed to a strategy donor. Some previous studies have
considered the different situations [61, 62] and showed that the direction of
strategy imitation can influence the evolutionary outcomes. For example,
one study found that cooperation is enhanced on various lattices if the focal
agent is a recipient as opposed to a donor [60]. Although strategy updat-
ing rules in these studies were all based on the premise that fitter strategies
are more likely to proliferate in the population, the ensuing cooperation lev-
els can differ. Hence, because the details of evolutionary processes, such as
strategy updating rules, can affect outcomes, the robustness of evolutionary
outcomes have been compared between various rules [63]. For example, some
studies dealt with models other than the prisoner’s dilemma, and investigated
whether the direction of copying (imitation) affects fixation probability of an
advantageous mutant [64, 65]. In addition, a recent study showed that strat-
egy updating rules can change the consequences of evolutionary processes
in well-mixed populations with mutations [66], and coevolution of strategies
and updating rules has been considered [67]. In addition, strategy updat-
ing rules that are not informed by imitation of fitter individuals have been
investigated [68].
In contrast to the preceding literature that examined the evolutionary
process on static networks, our current work investigates the effect of strategy
updating rules in coevolutionary games. Although many previous studies
assume a specific strategy updating rule, such as VMLD, and showed that
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cooperation is enhanced in combination with network evolution, the roles
of updating rules in these phenomena have not been elucidated. Because
network coevolution supports cooperation [69], further studies are warranted
to investigate dependences on the details of these models.
Herein, we study the effect of the combination of link adaptation and
three strategy updating rules. Three updating rules used in this study arose
from research on network interactions. Node-based strategy updating occurrs
under the first two rules: voter-model-like dynamics (VMLD) and invasion-
process-like dynamics (IPLD) [60]. Specifically, under these two dynamics,
one node (agent i) is selected randomly, and then one neighbour of that node
(agent j) is selected randomly. Strategy updating occurs by comparing the
payoff of these two agents. Under VMLD, agent i copies the strategy of
neighbour j with higher probability if agent j earns a larger payoff when
compared with agent i. In contrast, under IPLD, neighbour j may imitate
the strategy of agent i. Therefore, a randomly chosen neighbour (j) serves as
a strategy donor under VMLD and a strategy recipient under IPLD. The last
rule is edge-based dynamics (EBD). Under this rule, one link (Eij) is selected
randomly, and the role of the two connected agents (donor or recipient)
is randomly assigned. The payoff of these two agents is compared, and a
recipient copies the donor’s strategy with higher probability if a donor earns
a larger payoff. Unlike other two rules, EBD does not fix the roles of the
focal agent and its neighbour in strategy transmission, and is eclectic. In the
present analyses, VMLD and IPLD are sometimes biased toward enhancing
and suppressing cooperation, respectively. Hence, in these cases, EBD with
an intermediate feature may serve as a less biased rule.
Here, we first detail our coevolutionary model and the three strategy
update rules. We next report the results of a computer simulation. Lastly,
we discuss the implication of our results for the modelling of the evolutionary
process of human cooperation.
2. Model
Let us assume that N agents are located on a (social) network defined
by the neighbours of each node. Links between nodes represent the social
relationship. Initially, each agent has the same number of neighbours (〈k〉)
that are randomly linked to other nodes (see [70] for the generation process of
this random regular network). Half of the agents, who are chosen randomly,
are cooperators, and the rest are defectors. We denote agents’ strategy by
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the two-dimensional vector s. Agent i is a cooperator if si = (1, 0)
T and a
defector if si = (0, 1)
T . In this numerical simulation, the payoff matrix (A)
is given by [4]:
(C D
C 1 0
D b 0
)
, (1)
where b is the temptation to defect (1 < b < 2). In each time step, a strategy
updating event or a partner switching (link adaptation) event occurs.
Strategy updating events occur with probability 1 − w. We use three
types of strategy updating mechanisms. The first one is VMLD. Under this
rule, one node (i) is chosen randomly, and one of the i’s neighbours (j) is
also selected randomly. Then, each agent plays the prisoner’s dilemma game
with their neighbours and collects a payoff:
Πi = Σl∈Nis
T
i Asl, (2)
where Ni is the set of agent i’s neighbours and Πj is accumulated in the same
manner. The payoff is reset to zero at the end of each event. Agent i decides
whether to copy j’s strategy based on their accumulated payoff. Specifically,
agent i copies the strategy of agent j with a probability calculated by Fermi’s
rule [71]:
P (si ← sj) = [1 + exp(−β(Πj − Πi))]
−1. (3)
The value of β represents the intensity of selection (β → 0 implies random
drift, whereas β →∞ implies imitation dynamics).
The second rule is IPLD. Under this rule, two agents (i and j) are selected
and accumulate a payoff (Πi and Πj) in the same manner as VMLD. The
difference is that the neighbour j copies the strategy of agent i with the
following probability:
P (sj ← si) = [1 + exp(−β(Πi −Πj))]
−1. (4)
Therefore, the chosen neighbour (j) serves as a potential strategy donor under
VMLD and a potential recipient under IPLD.
The third rule is EBD. Under this rule, one edge is chosen randomly
and each agent’s role in strategy updating (donor or recipient) is randomly
assigned. Each agent plays the prisoner’s dilemma with their neighbours and
collects a payoff. Next, a recipient (i) copies the strategy of the donor (j)
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with probability P(si ← sj). Previous study assumed that agent j copies
i’s strategy unless agent i imitates j’s strategy [43]. In contrast, agent j
is not permitted to update the strategy because only one agent can copy
the neighbour’s strategy under the conditions of the other rules (VMLD
and IPLD). Note that both agent i and j have the possibility to copy the
strategy of the other agent ex ante under EBD, whereas the role in the
strategy updating is fixed under VMLD and IPLD.
With probability w, partner switching (link adaptation) events occur.
The basic idea of the partner switching mechanism used in our current work
stems from Zimmermann et al. [37]. In their pioneering work on the coevo-
lutionary prisoner’s dilemma game, these authors reported that cooperation
can evolve if a defective agent deters the relationship with another defective
agent. Here, we also assume that edges between two defectors are unstable
and that one of the defectors tries to deter the relationship. Specifically,
in link adaptation events, one edge Eij is chosen randomly. If the chosen
edge represents a D − D interaction, one randomly chosen agent i(j) stops
the interaction with the current partner j(i) and constructs a new link with
a randomly chosen agent. If the selected edge represents other situations
(C−C or C−D), nothing occurs during that period. We impose the restric-
tion that nodes with one link do not lose edges so that they can participate
in prisoner’s dilemma game.
Notably, we do not directly replicate the model of Zimmermann et al. For
example, we use the Fermi function in strategy updating events even though
it was not used in the original work because the effect of the intensity of
selection is the quantity of interest in our research. In addition, we use asyn-
chronous updating, whereas the original paper used synchronous updating,
and agents who change their strategy from C to D deter the relationship.
Because of these differences, our results should not be regarded as a valida-
tion or a criticism of the work by Zimmerman et al. Here, our goal is to
examine the effects of strategy updating mechanisms.
3. Results
To investigate the effects of updating rules in coevolving prisoner’s dilemma
games, we conducted a numerical simulation. Each simulation run continued
for 2×107 periods, and the values of the following 106 periods were recorded
to compute the average frequency of cooperators, unless one strategy domi-
nated the population. We conducted 1000 independent simulations for each
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Figure 1: Proportion of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect (b).
In the absence of partner switching, the same results are observed regardless of
updating rules (w = 0 in panel (a)). In comparison, cooperators with partner
switching resist larger temptations to defect in the order of VMLD, EBD and
IPLD (w = 0.5 in panel (b) and w = 0.99 in panel (c)). Parameters: N =
1000, 〈k〉 = 8, β = 1.
combination of parameters, and calculated the mean values of the simulation
results. These values were always utilised unless otherwise stated.
The emerging pattern as a function of the temptation to defect (b) is
shown in Figure 1. As expected, a larger temptation to defect induces less
cooperation regardless of the strategy updating rule. Here, our interest is
to compare the different strategy updating rules. In comparisons of strategy
updating rules without partner switching (w = 0), cooperation levels do not
differ according to strategy updating rules (panel (a)). In contrast, different
patterns are observed with the introduction of partner switching (w = 0.5).
VMLD facilitates the evolution of cooperation under a wider range of temp-
tations to defect, whereas cooperation deteriorates rapidly under IPLD. The
results of EBD lie between these two results, and similar patterns are ob-
served with rapid partner switching (w = 0.99, panel (c)).
We next examined the effect of the frequency of partner switching. Fig-
ure 2 shows the resulting proportions of cooperators and network struc-
tures. Reported network properties include normalised variance of degrees
([〈k2i 〉 − 〈ki〉
2]/〈ki〉), cluster coefficients and assortativity [72], which were
recorded at the end of each simulation run. The upper four panels show
results with b = 1.05 and the lower panels show results with b = 1.3.
When b = 1.05, cooperation is greatly enhanced under VMLD and EBD
even with a small probability of link adaptation. In contrast, under IPLD,
we observed a non-monotonic relationship between w and the proportion of
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Figure 2: Proportion of cooperators and resulting network properties as a function
of frequencies of link adaptation (w). Fast link adaptation facilitates (suppresses)
the evolution of cooperation under VMLD (IPLD), whereas partner switching
helps cooperators under EBD at appropriate speeds. Larger degree heterogeneity,
higher cluster coefficients and negative assortativity tend to coevolve with higher
levels of cooperation. Parameters: b = 1.05 (upper four panels), b = 1.3 (lower
four panels); fixed; N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 8, β = 1.
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cooperators. Notably, the evolution of cooperation is impeded with a higher
frequency of partner switching. When the temptation to defect is larger
(b = 1.3), the effect of the frequency of link adaptation is consistent with
the aforementioned results. Cooperation can evolve easily even with small
w under VMLD, whereas partner switching does not help the evolution of
cooperation under IPLD. The results for EBD lie between these two results.
Under EBD, an extremely larger w deteriorates cooperation, suggesting that
defectors can find cooperative partners using larger opportunities for partner
switching.
The resultant patterns of networks are compatible with those reported in a
previous study of coevolutionary games [73]. In particular, the first character
of the network that coevolves with cooperation is degree heterogeneity. When
b = 1.05, degree heterogeneity increases with greater opportunities for link
adaptation under VMLD and EBD. In contrast, a non-monotonic relationship
similar to that of cooperation level is observed under IPLD. When b = 1.3,
degree heterogeneity increases more with smaller values of w under VMLD
than under those of EBD. This pattern corresponds with that of cooperation
level, and higher levels of cooperation are achieved with a smaller w under
VMLD. Moreover, degree heterogeneity is almost suppressed under IPLD.
Larger cluster coefficients also coevolve with cooperation, especially in
VMLD and EBD. Moreover, a non-monotonic pattern is observed again un-
der IPLD when b = 1.05. In the study by Zimmermann et al. [37] mod-
est evolution of cluster coefficients was observed with enhanced cooperation.
Other studies also show that larger cluster coefficients are related to the evo-
lution of cooperation [68]. Furthermore, we find that negative assortativity
of degrees emerges with cooperation, and emerging negative assortativity
was previously shown in a study of coevolution using the prisoner’s dilemma
game [73].
Figures 1 and 2 show that cooperators flourish in the order of VMLD,
EBD and IPLD. We can explain this pattern by considering how often the
cooperators are chosen as the potential strategy donor or recipient. In the
coevolving prisoner’s dilemma, it is often assumed that defectors are more
likely to lose edges. Cooperators tend to have larger number of neighbours,
and therefore cooperators are more likely to be chosen as the neighbour of the
focal agent under VMLD and IPLD. Under VMLD, because the randomly
chosen neighbour serves as the potential donor of the strategy, cooperators
have a greater chance to be imitated. This advantage for cooperators was pre-
viously observed, i.e., the result that cooperators flourish despite the smaller
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average payoff when compared with defectors [48]. In contrast, because the
neighbour serves as the potential strategy recipient under IPLD, cooperators
have more opportunity to imitate others’ strategy. This difference in the
frequency of cooperators becoming a donor (recipient) of the strategy sup-
ports (hinders) the evolution of cooperation under VMLD (IPLD). Because
cooperators have a greater chance to imitate and to be imitated under EBD,
the result lies between the other two processes.
This tendency influences how the cooperators enjoy the benefit of a larger
degree. In Figure 3, we classified agents by their degrees (ki) at t = 10
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and calculated the proportion of cooperators at t = 104 and t = 2 × 104,
respectively. Panels (a1) and (b1) show proportions of cooperators at t = 104,
and panels (a2) and (b2) show values at t = 2 × 104. In typical coevolving
prisoner’s dilemma games, cooperators achieve larger degrees and hence have
greater resistance to invasion by defectors. This relationship is confirmed in
panels (a1) and (a2), which show results for b = 1.05 and w = 0.3. Under
these conditions, almost full cooperation is observed (upper left panel of
Figure 2 shows the corresponding final outcomes) and agents with larger
degrees are more likely to be cooperators. Furthermore, these agents remain
cooperative at t = 2×104 regardless of the strategy updating rules, although
the relationship between the frequency of cooperators and each agent’s degree
is weakened.
When b = 1.3 and w = 0.5, the relationships vary depending on strat-
egy updating rules (lower left panel of Figure 2 shows the corresponding final
cooperation level). In panel (b1), large degrees are related to higher coopera-
tion levels regardless of updating rules, and the relationship is stronger in the
order of VMLD, EBD and IPLD. However, the data in panel (b2) indicates
that whether an agent with large degree can remain cooperative depends
on updating rules. Under VMLD, in which full cooperation was achieved,
the same pattern is observed and larger degrees facilitate cooperators. In
contrast, under IPLD, in which defectors were dominant, relationships are
unstable and cooperators do not enjoy the benefits of larger degrees. Under
EBD, in which moderate levels of cooperation were observed, the results lie
between those of the other two rules. Specifically, the relationship between
degree and cooperation is confirmed but is weaker than that under VMLD.
Different patterns also appear for the effect of the intensity of selection
(β). When β = 0, the payoff from games has a totally neutral effect on evo-
lution. As is displayed in Figure 4, full cooperation is achieved under VMLD
with a small opportunity for partner switching, whereas cooperation is sup-
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Figure 3: Frequency of cooperators at t = 104 and t = 2×104 as a function of nodes’
degree at t = 104. Accumulations of 104 simulation runs are presented. Because
nodes with larger degrees rarely appear during simulations and the sample size is
small, we report the results of large degrees together. (a1) and (a2), Larger degree
facilitates cooperation regardless of strategy updating rules when b = 1.05 and
w = 0.3. (b1) and (b2), Cooperators can exploit the benefits of larger degrees in
the order of VMLD, EBD and IPLD when b = 1.3 and w = 0.5. Fixed parameters:
N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 8, β = 1.
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Figure 4: Fractions of cooperators when the payoff has neutral effect (β = 0).
Partner switching helps (hinders) cooperation under VMLD (IPLD). Neither co-
operation nor defection is favored under EBD. Parameters: N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 8, b =
1.3, β = 0.
pressed under IPLD. The results under EBD lie between these results, i.e.,
neither cooperation nor defection is favoured. Because cooperators acquire
larger degrees, they have larger opportunities to become strategy donors or
recipients under VMLD or IPLD, respectively. When the payoff has no effect
on evolutionary outcomes, this difference in directions of strategy imitation
is directly reflected by cooperation levels.
Thus, VMLD, which has been commonly used in previous studies [60], can
help the evolution of cooperation independently of the payoff because cooper-
ators are more likely to be chosen as the strategy donor. Some studies showed
that weak selection favours cooperation in coevolving games [39, 40, 46]. We
infer that VMLD also played an important role in the evolutionary process, in
addition to a coevolutionary mechanism. Hence, VMLD and IPLD are biased
toward supporting and suppressing cooperation, respectively, whereas EBD
has a neutral effect on cooperation levels in coevolving prisoner’s dilemma
games.
We also show the effect of the intensity of selection (β) in Figure 5.
Under VMLD, full cooperation is achieved more easily when selection is
weak or strong, and a higher frequency of link adaptation is required with
moderate values of β. Qualitatively the same pattern is observed under
EBD; cooperation deteriorates when the values of β are moderate, and a
higher w enhances the evolution of cooperation even with a weaker intensity
of selection. This pattern is contrary to the results under the static network,
which showed that there exists an optimal intensity of selection in supporting
evolution of cooperation [74]. Under IPLD, stronger selection is required for
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Figure 5: Fractions of cooperators as a function of the intensity of selection (β).
Non-monotonic relationship is observed and moderate intensity of selection hinders
the evolution of cooperation under VMLD and EBD. Only strong selection helps
cooperators under IPLD. Parameters: N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 8, b = 1.3.
cooperators to survive, especially when the high frequency of link adaptation
hinders the evolution of cooperation.
The overall resulting pattern can be explained by the combination of the
effects of partner switching and strategy updating rules. Partner switching is
beneficial for cooperators due to the emerging degree heterogeneity [75] and
cooperators can gain a larger accumulated payoff by link adaptation unless w
is too large (see Figure 2). As a result, a stronger intensity of selection helps
cooperators with a larger degree to maintain their strategy. However, because
cooperators are sustained by VMLD (and to a lesser extent by EBD) when
the intensity of selection is extremely weak, a stronger intensity of selection
can reduce the advantage of the strategy updating rules. Indeed, a non-
monotonic effect of β is observed under VMLD and EBD. In contrast, IPLD
hinders the evolution of cooperation, therefore only the combination of a
stronger intensity of selection and appropriate frequency of partner switching
helps cooperators.
Because the results of evolutionary network games can vary with the
synchronicity of strategy updates, we perform further computations with
synchronous updating. In this version of the model, each simulation round
is conducted by selecting all N agents in a random order. Under these con-
ditions, link adaptation events occur with probability W , and a focal agent
may cut the link with a randomly selected neighbour and reconnect it with
a randomly selected agent. Link adaptation occurs when a focal agent and
a selected neighbour are both defectors. Conversely, strategy updates occur
with probabilities of 1 −W and lead to accumulations of payoffs for a focal
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agent and a single neighbour as in asynchronous updating. Strategy imita-
tions are determined using Fermi’s rule. In VMLD, a focal agent becomes a
recipient of the strategy and a neighbour becomes a donor of the strategy,
and the roles of the two agents are switched in IPLD. Under random (RAND)
rule, roles of two agents are determined randomly. We introduce RAND rule
instead of EBD because sweeping is conducted by agent after agent. This
rule corresponds to EBD where the roles of agents are not fixed.
Some clarifications may be required before explaining the simulation re-
sults. A single link can be severed by both agents who are connected by
that edge at one time step, whereas only one decision is reflected in the next
round. In addition, although some agents may serve as recipients of the strat-
egy multiple times under IPLD and RAND, the consequence of one event is
reflected in the next round, regardless of whether imitation occurred in that
event.
These simulations with synchronous updating (Figure 6) show differing
behaviours without link adaptation (panel (a)) and cooperators are more
likely to survive under the RAND rule. However, a similar pattern to that
observed in Figure 1 is replicated when partner switching is permitted and
cooperation is supported in the order of VMLD, RAND and IPLD (panels (b)
and (c)). This is because the same logic also works in synchronous updating.
Under VMLD, cooperative agents who have large degrees are more likely to
be selected as a neighbour of a focal agent and have better opportunities
to enforce their strategy. In contrast, cooperative agents are more likely to
imitate neighbour’s strategies under IPLD and defectors who tend to have
small numbers of neighbours may never serve as strategy recipients in single
time steps. The results of the RAND rule which has the characteristics of
VMLD and IPLD lie between the other two cases.
Finally, we examine the effects of strategy updating rules on games con-
ducted using static heterogeneous networks. Because no link adaptation
occurs under these conditions, we cannot directly apply the same logic that
affected the evolutionary processes of coevolutionary games. By the defini-
tion of static networks, the adopted strategy does not change degrees, and
the probabilities of agents becoming recipients or donors of the strategy re-
main unaffected. However, a seminal study of the positive effects of degree
heterogeneity [39] suggested that hub nodes are more likely to be cooperators
and that clusters of cooperators tend to form around them. These hub nodes
may contribute to the evolution of cooperation in combination with VMLD.
Because hub agents are more likely to be donors of strategies under VMLD,
14
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Figure 6: Proportion of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect (b).
Simulation runs continued for 2× 104 periods, and the values of the following 103
periods were recorded. Due to slow convergence, sampling started after 4 × 105
periods when W = 0 and b ≤ 1.04. The pattern in Figure 1 is replicated with
synchronous updating. Parameters: N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 8, β = 1.
cooperation may be efficiently enforced. In this regard, studies of the effect
of updating rules on the games on heterogeneous networks may be a natu-
ral extension of this study. The present heterogeneous network is generated
using preferential or uniform attachment, corresponding with evolutionary
processes on Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks [76] and exponential networks,
respectively.
The results of the present simulation of heterogeneous networks (Figure 7)
show that VMLD offer the most advantageous environment for cooperators.
In contrast, cooperators can flourish in IPLD under limited parameter ranges.
Because agents with large degrees are more likely to become recipients of
strategies under IPLD, it becomes more difficult for hub nodes to remain
cooperative and establish clusters of cooperators. Cooperation levels under
EBD lie between those of the other models. In addition, comparisons with
BA (panel (a)) and exponential (panel (b)) networks show that differences
that emerge from varied strategy updating rules are larger among BA net-
works. BA networks have larger degree heterogeneity, leading to increased
frequencies of becoming a donor or recipient. Compared with coevolving
games, different patterns emerge under assumptions of extremely weak se-
lection. Specifically, significant differences between updating rules are not
observed when β = 0 (see Figure 4 for the results of coevolving games) and
the cooperation level is about 0.5 under all three rules, despite the presence
of degree heterogeneity (data not shown). Constant degrees of each node pre-
cluded effects of strategies on frequencies of becoming a donor or a recipient,
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Figure 7: Proportion of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect (b) on
static heterogeneous networks. Initially, we generated a complete network com-
prising m0 = 6 nodes and (N − m0) nodes were connected with m = 6 nodes
by preferential (panel(a)) or uniform (panel (b)) attachments. Simulation runs
continued for 2 × 108 (2 × 107) periods, and the values of the following 107 (106)
periods were recorded with BA (exponential) networks. Cooperators are more
likely to proliferate in the order of VMLD, EBD and IPLD, and this tendency is
stronger with BA networks. Parameters: N = 1000, w = 0, β = 1.
whereas in coevolving games, cooperativeness increases the opportunity for
strategy enforcement or learning in combination with VMLD or IPLD, re-
spectively. In static networks, VMLD supports the formation of cooperative
clusters that tend to produce large payoffs, and this leads to the evolution of
cooperation.
4. Discussion
In this paper, we compare the three strategy updating rules, VMLD,
IPLD and EBD, on the coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game. Our re-
sults show that VMLD, which were adopted in many previous studies, favour
cooperation under a wide range of parameters. This is because cooperators
who have larger number of neighbours are more likely to become a potential
strategy donor. In contrast, cooperators are more likely to become a strat-
egy recipient under IPLD, which prevents cooperators from enjoying the
benefit of degree heterogeneity. Consequently, a higher frequency of partner
switching sometimes deters the evolution of cooperation under IPLD. The
results of EBD lie between these two outcomes. Larger degree heterogeneity,
higher clustering, and negative assortativity coevolve with cooperation. In
addition, cooperation is supported or suppressed irrespective of payoffs un-
der VMLD or IPLD, respectively. Hence, combinations of strategy updating
16
rules and network evolution can affect evolutionary outcomes independently
of game results. EBD with intermediate characters are less amenable to this
effect. Furthermore, combined with the effect of the strategy updating rules,
a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of selection and propor-
tion of the cooperators is observed under VMLD and EBD, whereas stronger
selection favours cooperation under IPLD. Similar patterns of enhanced co-
operation are observed with synchronous updating and heterogeneous static
networks.
In previous studies, VMLD was often utilised as the strategy updating
rule. In the context of modelling human behaviour, strategy updating rules
can be regarded as the assumption for the social learning (imitation) process.
Specifically, updating rules determine the direction of influence. In our sim-
ulation, strategy updating rules influenced the possibility that agents with
a larger degree become a strategy donor (or recipient) and thus affected the
resulting cooperation level. Therefore, understanding who will be more likely
to imitate others and who will be imitated by others may be very important
for studying the evolution of human cooperation.
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